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It is well known that Americans of the founding era venerated the
rights of property owners. Property rights were closely linked with individual
liberty.1 Clearly, one of the principal objectives of the Framers was to
enhance the security of private property.2
Yet the historical relationship between property rights and free market
values is elusive and warrants careful exploration. How did the concept
of economic liberty impact the framing of the Constitution and Bill of
Rights? To what extent did the Framers embrace economic freedom and
embody this concept in the Constitution? These are not easy questions
to answer.3 Not only is the historical record sparse, but it is unlikely that
the Framers as a group shared the same outlook.4 Moreover, economic
liberty is a concept with different shades of meaning. Generalizations
must be approached with caution.
Despite these caveats, in this paper I will examine the growing support
for both the ideology and practice of economic liberty in the founding
era. By the late eighteenth century, Americans were increasingly challenging
British imperial governance, as well as long-accepted governmental
regulation of the economy. I argue that by the time of the Constitutional
Convention in 1787, the growing commitment to a market economy was
eclipsing the older mercantilist regime as the dominant paradigm in
political culture, and that this development in turn influenced the process
of constitution drafting.
I. THE MERCANTILIST BACKGROUND
To appreciate the emergence of economic liberty, we should briefly
consider the legal and economic landscape of England in the sixteenth

1. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 26–58 (3d ed. 2008); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 27–33 (2d ed.
1993); Walter Dellinger, The Indivisibility of Economic Rights and Personal Liberty,
2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 9, 19 (“Economic rights, property rights, and personal rights
have been joined, appropriately, since the time of the founding.”).
2. Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Concern for the Security of Property Rights on
the Legal System of the Early American Republic, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1136
(“Perhaps the most important value of the Founding Fathers of the American
constitutional period was their belief in the necessity of securing property rights.”).
3. For a discussion of the link between the Constitution and capitalism, see
Bernard H. Siegan, One People As to Commercial Objects, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 101, 101–19 (Ellen Frankel Paul &
Howard Dickman eds., 1989).
4. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY:
THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 14–16 (2002) (discussing
difficulties in determining the intent of the Framers and pointing out that “the evidence
of the original intent will often be fragmentary, unreliable, and conflicting”).
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and seventeenth centuries.5 Under the prevailing doctrine of mercantilism,
government played an active role in regulating commerce and stimulating
economic growth.6 The objective of the mercantile system was to increase
national wealth by controlling the economy and securing a favorable
balance of trade.7 Mercantilism encompassed a scheme of tariffs, subsidies,
grants of monopoly, and numerous regulations of private enterprise and
private bargaining.8 The English colonists of the seventeenth century
brought with them the legal norms and assumptions of the mother country.
Although the economic conditions of North America were much
different than those of England, colonial lawmakers imitated the English
practice of marketplace regulation and promotion.9 Moreover, as a practical
matter, the precarious existence of isolated North American Colonies in
the seventeenth century reinforced the perceived need for governmental
control of economic life.
A glance at the colonial statutes and ordinances of the seventeenth and
early eighteenth centuries demonstrates the pervasive concern of lawmakers
with economic regulation and protection of the supply of basic necessities.
Following the pattern in England, the colonists sought to regulate the
labor market. In addition to wage controls, there was comprehensive
legislation governing slaves, indentured servants, and apprentices. Likewise,
colonial lawmakers made repeated efforts to control the quality and price
of goods and services. For example, the price and weight of bread was
subject to widespread regulation throughout the Colonies.10 Local
pricing regulations sometimes also covered meat and beer.11 Grist mills
and ferryboats were treated as types of quasi-public enterprises, and tolls
for their services were set by law.12 The fees of attorneys, as well as
licensing requirements to practice law, were similarly fixed, a reflection

5. For a discussion of mercantilism and economic policy in England, see
RICHARD B. MORRIS, GOVERNMENT AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA 1–54 (1946); JON C.
TEAFORD, THE MUNICIPAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 3–15 (1975).
6. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 1–2.
7. Id.
8. For a treatment of mercantilist ideas and actions, see LARS MAGNUSSON,
MERCANTILISM: THE SHAPING OF AN ECONOMIC LANGUAGE 1–173 (1994); D.C. Coleman,
Mercantilism Revisited, 23 HIST. J. 773, 773–91 (1980).
9. See infra notes 51–109 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 54–81 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 82–90 and accompanying text.
12. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 38 (3d ed. 2005);
Raymond E. Hayes, Business Regulation in Early Pennsylvania, 10 TEMP. L.Q. 155,
171–72 (1936).
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of popular animosity toward the legal profession.13 Laws to license and
regulate peddlers were common.14 From England, the colonists adopted
intensive regulation of tavern operations.15 These laws required that
tavern keepers be licensed annually and fixed the charges for food, drink,
and lodging. Colonial legislators widely enacted usury laws patterned after
English rate ceilings to hold down the rate of interest in the hope of
encouraging trade and settlement.16 Yet many Colonies set the limit
higher than the prevailing rate in England in an effort to encourage
investment from abroad.17 Agriculture was also subject to legislative
oversight, particularly with respect to staple crops. Regulation of export
trade was designed to maintain the quality of commodities, and thus to
enhance the reputation of staple products from the Colonies in overseas
markets.18 The Maryland and Virginia legislatures, for instance, imposed
controls on the production and sale of tobacco, and sought to halt the
export of unsound tobacco.19 Pennsylvania enacted numerous laws
governing the export of wheat, flour, and meat.20 Similarly, South
Carolina regulated shipments of indigo abroad.21 This sketch of colonial
economic regulations is far from complete, but it does suggest a
commitment to mercantilist policies and a distrust of economic
liberty and open competition.
My focus is upon colonial market regulations, but it is important to
bear in mind that the colonial economy developed under the auspices of
the British imperial system. Mercantilist theory held that Colonies existed
primarily to benefit the mother country.22 For much of the seventeenth
century, however, England largely ignored the fledgling North American
Colonies. This period of neglect changed following the Stuart Restoration.23
Parliament imposed new controls designed to bind the Colonies more

13. CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 41–42, 53, 112 (1911).
14. Hayes, supra note 12, at 169.
15. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
16. James M. Ackerman, Interest Rates and the Law: A History of Usury, 1981
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 61, 85.
17. Id.
18. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 40–41 (discussing colonial efforts “to keep . . .
staple crops under some kind of quality control”); Hayes, supra note 12, at 161–62
(discussing export controls designed to maintain Pennsylvania’s reputation abroad).
19. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 40.
20. Hayes, supra note 12, at 159–62.
21. ELY, supra note 1, at 21.
22. KERMIT L. HALL & PETER KARSTEN, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 43 (2d ed. 2009).
23. For the impact of the Restoration on the Colonies, see generally WESLEY
FRANK CRAVEN, THE COLONIES IN TRANSITION, 1660–1713, at 1–103 (1968).
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closely within the imperial framework.24 The Navigation Acts sharply
curtailed freedom of trade by requiring that goods imported to the
Colonies must pass through England.25 Because direct importation from
continental Europe was prohibited, the manufactured goods purchased
by the colonists were largely made in England. Further, most raw
materials exported from the Colonies could be shipped only to England.26
Although these trade restrictions gave the Colonies privileged access to
the English market, they made the Colonies dependent on the mother
country for manufactured goods. Over time, the Navigation Acts shackled
colonial economic ambitions and engendered ill-feeling toward England.27
One goal of the American Revolution was to overthrow these controls
on the colonial economy and achieve economic independence. “It was a
commercial restriction which caused the revolution,” the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court recalled in 1853, “and injuries to our trade which
produced the subsequent war against England . . . .”28
On paper, at least, many facets of colonial economic life appear to
have been closely regulated. One would certainly be hard pressed to
picture colonial Americans as adherents of a strict laissez-faire philosophy.
Indeed, several scholars have suggested that colonial economic controls
anticipated later New Deal regulatory programs.29
II. THE RISE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL LIBERTY
How, then, can one maintain that the founding generation valued
economic liberty? Several factors point in this direction. We should
start by stressing the living law rather than focusing on a list of
legislative rules. There is room to doubt the efficacy of colonial
regulatory measures. Colonial governments were feeble institutions that
24. HALL & KARSTEN, supra note 22, at 18 (observing that “the restored Stuart
monarchy in England wished to knit the colonists more fully into the fabric of the
empire”).
25. OLIVER M. DICKERSON, THE NAVIGATION ACTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
7–9 (1951).
26. For the operation of the Navigation Acts, see DICKERSON, supra note 25, at 3–
30; CRAVEN, supra note 23, at 33–37; Nuala Zahedieh, Making Mercantilism Work:
London Merchants and Atlantic Trade in the Seventeenth Century, 9 TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y (6th ser.) 143, 144 (1999).
27. ELY, supra note 1, at 18–19.
28. Sharpless v. Mayor of Phila., 21 Pa. 147, 170 (1853).
29. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 40 (suggesting that colonial regulation of
staple crops foreshadowed New Deal farm programs); Hayes, supra note 12, at 155
(tracing regulations of New Deal era to Pennsylvania colonial laws).
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lacked a strong revenue base and supervisory officials. It followed that
enforcement mechanisms were lax and compliance with controls often
limited.30 A few examples illustrate the gap between legislative policy
and economic reality. Usury laws were easily evaded and likely had
little impact on ordinary credit relationships.31 Tavern regulations are
another case in point. One scholar declared: “Taverns are clearly the
number one exhibit in early America of a local business regulated by
government. . . .”32 Nonetheless, Virginia tavern regulations were widely
ignored, and local officials did little in response to chronic complaints
about overcharging.33 The very fact that legislators so frequently altered
and amended regulatory legislation gives rise to an inference that prior
controls had proven ineffective.34 In sum, a focus solely on the formal
law may yield a false measure of the amount of economic liberty in the
colonial world.
Aside from regulatory failure, larger economic trends strengthened
colonial receptivity to greater market freedoms by the late eighteenth
century. During the eighteenth century, the Colonies experienced rapid
population growth, economic expansion, and an increase in the standard
of living.35 As the Colonies matured and grew prosperous, the perceived
need for comprehensive economic regulations gradually lapsed. A
flourishing Atlantic trade brought ever more colonists into a market
economy.36 In a world increasingly shaped by opportunity rather than

30. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 39 (“[T]he people who ran the colonies had very
little in the way of tax money, or staff, at their disposal.”).
31. HENRY W. FARNAM, CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN THE
UNITED STATES TO 1860, at 88–91 (1938); Ackerman, supra note 16, at 61, 85 (noting
that colonial usury laws “seem to have been widely evaded”).
32. Paton Yoder, Tavern Regulation in Virginia: Rationale and Reality, 87 VA.
MAG. HIST. & BIO. 259, 273 (1979); see also MORRIS, supra note 5, at 21 (“In the
Southern colonies the setting of tavern rates was the most consistent example of price
regulation undertaken by the county or sessions courts right through the Revolutionary
period.”).
33. Yoder, supra note 32, at 266–78 (noting numerous complaints about illegal
rates as well as lapses in the licensing process); HALL & KARSTEN, supra note 22, at 42
(pointing out that local officials often ignored tavern regulations “they perceived as
unimportant or unenforceable”).
34. E.A.J. JOHNSON, AMERICAN ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY 142–43 (photo. reprint 1961) (1932) (“Very often [economic regulations]
failed in their purpose; in fact, the necessity of their re-inactment [sic] is proof of their
evasion.”).
35. Marc Egnal, The Economic Development of the Thirteen Continental Colonies,
1720 to 1775, 32 WM. & MARY Q. 191–222 (1975). See also GORDON S. WOOD, THE
RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 169 (1991) (pointing out that in the colonial
world of the 1760s and 1770s, “[f]or most white Americans there was greater prosperity
than anywhere else in the world”).
36. JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN
VISION OF THE 1790S, at 40–41 (1984).
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scarcity, many colonists relied on individual initiative and private
bargaining, and saw the regulatory regimes of the past—both imperial
and domestic—as an impediment to their economic ambitions.37
Of course, this change of attitude did not occur abruptly, but the
impact of the new outlook was clear by the time of the founding. At
first, few questioned the right of government to control economic activities,
but many increasingly doubted the wisdom of such regulations. In time,
however, some took the next step and challenged the authority of
government to supervise economic exchanges in a free market. To trace
this evolution, let us consider several aspects of the colonial economy.
III. WAGE CONTROLS
The origins of wage regulation in the Colonies can be found in the
English Statute of Laborers (1350) and the Statute of Artificers (1563).38
The first of these measures, passed in response to the labor shortage
caused by the Black Death, sought to compel work at pre-plague
wages.39 This legislation was replaced by the Statute of Artificers, under
which justices of the peace were empowered to determine wages
annually for each county.40 It bears emphasis that these laws were framed
in large part to hold down wages.41 Thus, employment relationships in
the English tradition were governed by regulatory regimes rather than
contracts between employers and workers.42 This reflected lingering
medieval notions of a static society in which one’s place was fixed by
birth and status.
The English policy of regulating wages was transported to the
Colonies. Throughout much of the seventeenth century, the Colonies—
especially in New England—experimented with wage controls.43 There
was initially no objection to the principle of wage regulation.44
Conditions in colonial America, however, were radically different than
in England, and did much to undermine wage controls. The bulk of the

37.
38.

Id. at 28–39.
John V. Orth, Contract and the Common Law, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT 44, 50–53 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1998).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 51.
41. Id.; see also MORRIS, supra note 5, at 19.
42. Orth, supra note 38, at 50–51.
43. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 55–91; FARNAM, supra note 31, at 57–60.
44. Id.
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labor force consisted of self-employed farmers.45 Relatively few people
worked for wages, and they could in most cases easily obtain land of
their own.46 Free labor was therefore both scarce and mobile. The chronic
shortage of labor explains the heavy colonial reliance on an unfree work
force composed of slaves, convicts, and indentured servants, but it also
rendered futile legislative attempts to cap wages for free labor. Market
pressures simply drove wages higher despite statutory ceilings. Historians
agree that efforts to limit the cost of labor in the colonial era were a
failure. Lawrence M. Friedman has aptly noted: “Wage-price regulation
was virtually abandoned by 1700.”47
In its place there developed a system of labor relations in which wages
were determined by market forces and bargaining. Earlier wage
regulations were either repealed or ignored. In their study of wage
controls in Massachusetts, Richard M. Morris and Jonathan Grossman
concluded:
But all signs point to the disintegration in the eighteenth century of the general
scheme of wage-fixing in Massachusetts, despite the fact that the basic system
embodied in the Codes of 1648 and 1660 remained on the law books unrepealed.
The absence of extensive regulatory codes, considered in conjunction with other
factors, is evidence of the breakdown of mercantilism as a system of internal
regulation and of the rise of laissez-faire practices in industry and commerce
considerably before the Revolution.48

By the end of the seventeenth century, the intermittent interest in wage
controls withered in other Colonies as well.49
Notwithstanding archaic wage controls embodied in law, in reality a
wage labor market grounded on contracts emerged by the eve of the
Revolution. Individuals were free to pursue their own interests and to
bargain over wages. One prominent scholar observed: “In colonial
times, in areas or during periods in which the regulation of wages was
not a matter of public concern, the wage rate was determined by a
bargain between employer and employee.”50 Thus, the law of employment
was transformed by the collapse of wage regulation and the growth of
free contract ideas.
45. Egnal, supra note 35, at 200–01 (“Farming was the most important colonial
occupation, and was the chief employment of between 80 and 90 percent of the working
population.”).
46. FARNAM, supra note 31, at 57 (“The people who worked for wages were not
numerous enough to constitute an important class, and the ease with which land could be
obtained, as well as the great difficulty of obtaining labor in a new country, made them
independent.”).
47. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 43.
48. Richard B. Morris & Jonathan Grossman, The Regulation of Wages in Early
Massachusetts, 11 NEW ENG. Q. 470, 498 (1938).
49. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 43.
50. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 208.
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IV. PRICE REGULATIONS
Colonial lawmakers also adopted pervasive schemes of price regulation,
covering the sale of a wide range of products. Such legislation harked
back to the medieval notion of a just price, under which considerations
of fairness and customary pricing could trump the right to charge market
prices.51 Price controls reflected thinking molded by an economy of
scarcity.
The story of colonial price regulations is more complex than that of
wage controls. Not only did pricing controls reach a large variety of
commodities, but price regulations persisted longer than those governing
wages.52 As late as 1763, for example, the Common Council of New
York City enacted a detailed schedule setting “reasonable prices for all
sorts of Victuals.”53 In short, attempts to fix prices did not collapse as
abruptly as the efforts to hold down wages. Nonetheless, by the late
eighteenth century, the ideology of economic liberty made steady inroads
on price fixing regimes. I will examine this process by concentrating on
regulations dealing with the price of bread and meat.
No transaction was regulated more closely and for a longer time than
the sale of bread. Following the practice in England, colonial localities
from Boston to Charleston were typically authorized to establish the
assize of bread during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.54 Under
the assize, the price and weight of bread was fixed in accordance with
the price of flour.55 The set price varied for different kinds of bread.56
Bakers were required to mark their bread, and those who failed to meet
the weight and price specifications were subject to a fine and seizure of
their bread.57 The purpose behind the assize of bread was to protect the

51. JOHNSON, supra note 34, at 123, 139, 221.
52. Still, it is noteworthy that efforts of colonial officials in Virginia to limit trade
and set maximum prices were unpopular and controversial in the seventeenth century.
William E. Nelson, Authority and the Rule of Law in Early Virginia, 29 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 305, 355–57 (2003).
53. THOMAS F. DEVOE, THE MARKET BOOK: A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC MARKETS
IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK 140 (photo. reprint 1969) (1862).
54. For the assize of bread, see generally FARNAM, supra note 31, at 107–12; see
also MORRIS, supra note 5, at 161–66; 1 WILLIAM G. PANSCHAR, BAKING IN AMERICA:
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 26–27 (1956).
55. FARNAM, supra note 31, at 107–12.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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public from the perceived abuses of bakers. The New Hampshire
legislature explained in 1766 that the assize was needed because
a just Proportion between the Price of Flour and the Weight and Price of Bread
is now a Matter of Importance as many People purchase the greatest part of
their Bread of Bakers and without such Regulation they are left to Judge for
themselves where their Impartiality will be much Questioned . . . .58

As this statutory language suggests, the assize was usually justified in
terms of greedy bakers and vulnerable customers.
As might be expected, efforts to enforce the assize of bread proved
difficult. Starting in the early seventeenth century, bakers often protested,
arguing that the set price was inadequate and that they should receive
greater return for their labor. Philadelphia bakers in 1751 asked to be
freed from the assize of bread.59 Bakers succeeded from time to time in
obtaining upward adjusted prices for bread.60 To add muscle to their
complaints, bakers periodically resorted to strikes. As early as 1659,
bakers in New York City refused to bake until local officials raised the
prices for bread.61 There was also a short-lived work stoppage in 1741.62
Likewise, bakers in Charleston stopped baking in November of 1786,
complaining about an insufficient price under the assize.63 Nor were
consumers entirely happy. There were frequent charges that bakers were
ignoring the assize and charging market prices. Clearly, the assize of
bread had become highly contentious by the end of the eighteenth
century.64
Bakers increasingly demanded not just higher price schedules but an
end to municipal regulation of prices.65 As the ideology of economic
liberty gained ground, the days of the assize of bread were numbered.
Baltimore and New Haven decided not to control the price of breadstuffs.66
In December of 1792, Philadelphia and Boston bakers petitioned the
legislatures of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts to end regulations on the

58. An Act to Regulate the Price & Assize of Bread, 6 Geo. 111. Orig. Acts, vol.
5, p. 83; recorded Acts, vol. 3, p. 11; N.H. Province Laws 387 (enacted Jan. 16, 1766).
59. 1 J. THOMAS SCHARF & THOMPSON WESTCOTT, HISTORY OF PHILADELPHIA,
1609–1884, at 245 (1884).
60. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 161–62.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 162–65.
63. LEILA SELLERS, CHARLESTON BUSINESS ON THE EVE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 23–24 (1934).
64. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 161 (“Relations between the public authorities and
the bakers were frequently tense, and at times culminated in actual strikes of master
workers.”).
65. TEAFORD, supra note 5, at 94–95.
66. Id.
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price and size of bread.67 They argued that competition would better set
prices than any assize.68 After consideration, the Pennsylvania legislature in
1793 suspended the assize of bread. The lawmakers noted concerns
about whether the assize “infringe[d] the equality of rights established
by the constitution of this commonwealth.”69 Four years later the assize
law was repealed, marking an end to bread price regulations in
Pennsylvania.70 One scholar concluded that in Pennsylvania, “it was
then deemed unconstitutional for the state to limit prices” aside from
monopolies.71
The campaign to eliminate the assize of bread in New York City is
especially illuminating. By the 1790s, bakers were petitioning the common
council, not simply to adjust bread prices, but to end regulation altogether.72
“Influenced by the burgeoning capitalist economy and freer economic
attitudes of the early national period,” one scholar has maintained, “they
deemed it grossly unfair for their profession to be singled out for income
limitation.”73 In 1800, the city responded to this demand by abolishing
bread price regulations.74 A decision by the common council to reinstitute
the assize in October of 1801 prompted a work stoppage by the angry bakers.75
An attempt by investors to organize a corporate bread enterprise—The
Bread Company—added to the controversy.76 What is striking, however, is
the extent to which the idea of economic liberty was at the center of the
ensuing debate. One defender of The Bread Company insisted: “No
mechanic should be restricted in his profits by any power—it is

67. DUNLAP’S AMERICAN DAILY ADVERTISER, April 4, 1793; Richard C. Bull, The
Constitutional Significance of Early Pennsylvania Price-Fixing Legislation, 11 TEMP.
L.Q. 314, 318–19 (1937).
68. Id.
69. Act of Sept. 4, 1793, ch. 1702, 14 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA
FROM 1682 TO 1801, at 510 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1909).
70. Act of Apr. 1, 1797, ch. 1947, 15 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA
FROM 1682 TO 1801, at 510 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1911).
71. Bull, supra note 67, at 319.
72. Howard B. Rock, The Perils of Laissez-Faire: The Aftermath of the New York
Bakers’ Strike of 1801, 17 LAB. HIST. 372, 374–75 (1976). The New York bakers
protested repeatedly during the 1790s that the price of flour and the wages of employees
had risen considerably while the price of bread was limited. Petitions of Bakers (Jan. 20,
1789, Nov. 4, 1792, June 22, 1793, Mar. 25, 1795) (on file with author and on file with
the New York City Department of Records and Information Services).
73. Rock, supra note 72, at 374.
74. Id. at 375.
75. Id. at 376.
76. Id. at 378–85.

683

ELY.FINAL.DOC

10/14/2008 12:00:03 PM

fundamentally contrary to every principle of Justice, and it strikes at the
root of industry.”77 The Bread Company failed, and the bakers continued to
press for repeal of the assize.78 Individual bakers, invoking free market
principles, occasionally defied the municipal regulations.79 In 1821,
New York City finally abandoned price controls on bread.80 Although a
hardy survivor of mercantilist policy, the assize was a belated casualty of
new economic thought.81
The cost of meat was also controlled from time to time, but not with
the same regularity as bread. There is evidence that attempts to fix the price
of meat ran into the same combination of practical and philosophical
objections that undercut the assize of bread. Consider the experience of
New York City. In 1763, toward the end of the French and Indian War,
there were complaints about the high cost of commodities and calls for
price regulation.82 In response, the common council attributed the high
prices to “the avarice” of suppliers.83 It set a schedule of “reasonable
prices” for a wide variety of meat and fish, including beef, pork, veal,
lamb, and chicken, all sold in the public market.84 Farmers and butchers
were outraged by these price regulations.85 Many halted meat sales in
the city, and offered to sell provisions at points outside municipal
jurisdiction.86
But the most salient aspect of this controversy for our purposes was
the explicit appeal to principles of economic freedom as a basis to
challenge price controls. Describing themselves as “friends to the liberty of
Englishmen,” a number of farmers and butchers boldly asserted: “We
thought we were born free Englishmen, and had the liberty, as such, to
sell our own effects at our own liberty.”87 Moreover, some butchers openly
defied the law and sold at market prices.88 Reflecting a gradual shift in
attitude, the butchers now called for a free market in provisions.89

77. Id. at 384.
78. Id. at 385.
79. Id. at 385–86.
80. Id. at 387.
81. Id. at 384; see also PANSCHAR, supra note 54, at 27 (pointing out that “the
bread laws became less severe both in scope and impact as the 18th century drew to a
close,” and asserting that “a growing spirit of free competition tended to make such
measures obsolete”).
82. DEVOE, supra note 53, at 139–40.
83. Id. at 140.
84. Id. at 140–45.
85. Id. at 145.
86. Id. at 145–47.
87. Id. at 147.
88. Id. at 148–49.
89. Id. at 149–50.
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Following a familiar pattern, city officials found a temporary solution by
raising the set prices of meat to appease the butchers.90
V. PUBLIC MARKETS
Closely allied to price regulation was the establishment of public
markets in colonial cities.91 Drawing upon long-settled English practice,
lawmakers sought to organize and control private trading. As one scholar
noted, “Farmers entering the larger towns encountered regulations which
considerably abridged their freedom of marketing . . . .”92 Market regulations
prescribed the time and place for trade, banned buying and selling
outside the market, and mandated the use of standard weights and
measures. Thus, all sellers and prospective purchasers were brought
together in one place. The clerk of the market supervised operations,
sought to maintain quality control of commodities sold in the market,
and endeavored to eliminate fraudulent practices.93 Municipalities
rented stalls in the market to sellers.94 To protect this regulated market,
municipalities commonly legislated against forestalling and engrossing.
Forestalling was the practice of purchasing commodities on the way to
market with the intention of reselling at a higher price. The practice of
engrossing was the purchase of a large amount of a particular commodity in
the hope of increasing its price above the market level.95 It was thought
that such activities raised prices without providing a service and that
they threatened to monopolize the supply of commodities.96 The
purpose of establishing public markets was to provide the urban population
90. Id.; see also MAX GEORGE SCHUMACHER, THE NORTHERN FARMER AND HIS
MARKETS DURING THE LATE COLONIAL PERIOD 136–38 (1975) (discussing the failed
attempt to set a comprehensive list of food prices for New York City in 1763, and
pointing out that “the idea of just price clashed with the rising doctrine of the free
market”).
91. For a discussion of public markets in the colonial era, see CARL BRIDENBAUGH,
CITIES IN THE WILDERNESS: THE FIRST CENTURY OF URBAN LIFE IN AMERICA 1652–1742,
at 192–95, 349–53 (1938); FARNAM, supra note 31, at 77–80; ERNEST S. GRIFFITH,
HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 144–52 (1938);
J.R.T. HUGHES, SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE COLONIAL ECONOMY 126–27 (1976); SELLERS,
supra note 63, at 21–23; TEAFORD, supra note 5, at 39–43, 51–52.
92. SCHUMACHER, supra note 90, at 91.
93. James W. Ely, Jr., Patterns of Statutory Enactment in South Carolina, 1720–
1770, in SOUTH CAROLINA LEGAL HISTORY 69 (Herbert A. Johnson ed., 1980)
(discussing public market regulations in Charleston).
94. BRIDENBAUGH, supra note 91, at 349–50.
95. TEAFORD, supra note 5, at 9–10.
96. SCHUMACHER, supra note 90, at 93–94.
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with equal access to reasonably priced food and other necessities.97
Public supervision, not free trade by individuals, was the key characteristic
of these regulated markets.
Yet during the eighteenth century there was mounting criticism
directed against municipal controls on buying and selling. Legislative
language about the need for regulated markets did not match reality.
The imposition of market regulations never eliminated all private trading
elsewhere.98 Many farmers and traders preferred private marketing,
under which they could sell to customers at competitive prices.99 Complaints
about higher prices as a result of forestalling and engrossing were
frequent. Indeed, it appears that the law against forestalling was frequently
ignored.100
Moreover, there was a growing sense of skepticism about the supposed
advantages of public markets. Strong resistance to the establishment of
a public market appeared in Boston.101 Not only did Bostonians worry
that regulated markets would drive trade to other towns, but they
expressed concern that such controls constituted “a breach upon their
natural rights and liberties.”102 Persistent opposition doomed Boston’s efforts
to maintain a public market system. In 1737, a riotous mob destroyed
the municipal market houses.103 Pressure mounted in the 1740s against
public markets and commodity price fixing in Massachusetts.104 In the
1760s, Bostonians continued to argue that market controls should “not
deprive us of the liberty common to Englishmen.”105
Boston’s staunch resistance to public markets was unique in the
colonial era. A number of other cities, from Philadelphia to Charleston,

97. FARNAM, supra note 31, at 80 (“The colonial laws which established markets
and fairs were an attempt to organize trade in a general way, so as to assure to all the
people a fair chance to satisfy their needs.”); GARY B. NASH, THE URBAN CRUCIBLE:
SOCIAL CHANGE, POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 129–30 (1979) (pointing out that the idea behind public markets was to
make farm produce available to urban workers at reasonable prices).
98. SCHUMACHER, supra note 90, at 94 (observing “that the measures to restrict
retailers and to concentrate marketing were very frequently violated is clear”).
99. NASH, supra note 97, at 130–31.
100. There were persistent complaints about forestalling and engrossing. CARL
BRIDENBAUGH, CITIES IN REVOLT: URBAN LIFE IN AMERICA, 1743–1776, at 82 (1955);
SCHUMACHER, supra note 90, at 94; G.B. WARDEN, BOSTON 1689–1776, at 116 (1970).
101. TEAFORD, supra note 5, at 40–41.
102. Id. at 41; see also WARDEN, supra note 100, at 53 (“The establishment of
market regulations in itself implied a serious threat to the Bostonians’ freedom of
economic opportunity.”).
103. NASH, supra note 97, at 130–35; WARDEN, supra note 100, at 118–23.
104. WINIFRED BARR ROTHENBERG, FROM MARKET-PLACES TO A MARKET
ECONOMY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF RURAL MASSACHUSETTS, 1750–1850, at 98–99
(1992).
105. TEAFORD, supra note 5, at 43 (quoting BOSTON EVENING POST, Sept. 12, 1763).
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adopted the public market system.106 In 1763, as part of a comprehensive
price-fixing scheme, New York City prohibited all selling of many food
items outside the established market.107 Yet effective enforcement of the
market laws varied widely, and these regulations likely remained on the
books long after they had become a dead letter. One historian persuasively
concluded:
The elaborate and detailed regulations which these incursions into economic
control entailed were never fully successful, even in their heyday. By 1750 they
gave very definite indications of cracking under the strain of the mobility and
stir which had begun to characterize the urban centres of Philadelphia and New
York.108

By the eve of the Revolution, he added, “markets were no longer
exclusive,” and “only the hollow shell of limited trade regulation
remained.”109 The entrepreneurial spirit had prevailed over mercantilist
attachment to controlled markets.
VI. REAL PROPERTY LAW
In assessing economic controls in colonial America, historians have
concentrated upon commercial activity in urban centers. But colonial
life was predominantly rural in character. “Farming was the most important
colonial occupation,” one study stressed, “and was the chief employment of
between 80 and 90 percent of the working population.”110 The prospect of
acquiring land was one of the main inducements for colonists to settle in
North America.111 Given the availability of land, the vast majority of
farmers owned land.112 The law of real property was central to colonial
society in which land represented the primary source of wealth. Any
account of the growth of economic liberty, therefore, must take account
of the law governing real property.

106. BRIDENBAUGH, supra note 91, at 349–52.
107. DEVOE, supra note 53, at 140–45.
108. GRIFFITH, supra note 91, at 129.
109. Id. at 160; see also HUGHES, supra note 91, at 131 (observing that the system
of controlled markets “largely passed into history even before the end of the colonial
era”).
110. Egnal, supra note 35, at 200–01.
111. ELY, supra note 1, at 10–11.
112. WOOD, supra note 35, at 123 (“[M]ost American farmers owned their land.”).

687

ELY.FINAL.DOC

10/14/2008 12:00:03 PM

English land law provided the basis for colonial landownership.113 In
England, land was the preeminent basis of wealth and social status, and
consequently rules governing inheritance were central to English land
law.114 English law showed a strong preference for maintaining the
cohesiveness of landed estates over generations. The most striking expression
of this policy was the doctrine of primogeniture, under which all land in
cases of intestacy passed to the eldest male heir.115 This meant that the
estate would remain intact as one parcel. Closely related to primogeniture
was the practice of entailing estates.116 A landowner could provide by
conveyance that an estate should descend through the family line forever.117
Thereafter, the owner in each generation obtained what amounted to
only a life interest in the property. English law also protected landed
estates from seizure by creditors.118 This system shielded landholding
elite from the hazards of enterprise and the vicissitudes of a market
economy.
Conditions in North America, however, were very different from those
in England, and the traditional treatment of land was ill-suited to the
colonial experience. Land was scarce in England but abundant in North
America. Ownership of land was far more widespread than in England.
A 1777 pamphlet boasted that Americans were “a people of property;
almost every man is a freeholder.”119 These differences led to a gradual
transformation of property law during the colonial era. Land law reform
had two primary goals: to overhaul rules of inheritance and to foster the
free alienability of land. Both objectives reflected the desire to reshape
land law in ways consistent with the principle of economic liberty.
The New England Colonies started the process of dismantling the
traditional inheritance laws in the seventeenth century. Primogeniture
was deeply unpopular as a symbol of the aristocratic land order of
England.120 New Englanders rejected primogeniture in favor of partible
inheritance with an equal distribution of property among children upon
113. RICHARD B. MORRIS, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 73–75
(1930). For the English background of colonial land law, see id. at 69–125.
114. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 24.
115. MORRIS, supra note 113, at 73–81.
116. John V. Orth, After the Revolution: “Reform” of the Law of Inheritance, 10
LAW & HIST. REV. 33 (1992).
117. Id.
118. See infra notes 132–139 and accompanying text.
119. WOOD, supra note 35, at 234 (quoting PA. PACKET, Nov. 26, 1776; S.C. & AM.
GAZETTE, Nov. 6, 1777).
120. Stanley N. Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American
Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (1977) (“For the Revolutionary generation,
the law of inheritance took on a new, strategic importance, since it appeared to
symbolize the aristocratic aspects of English government against which the Revolution
increasingly directed itself.”).
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death.121 Pennsylvania followed suit.122 Primogeniture and entail existed
elsewhere in colonial America but were of declining importance.123
Because colonists had the right to dispose of land by will, landowners
could readily circumvent primogeniture.124 Entailed estates were impractical
because they could not be sold or used as the basis for credit. Thus, the
practice of entailing stalled economic development.125 Most states
abolished primogeniture and the fee tail estate at the time of the
American Revolution.126 Holdings in fee tail generally were converted
into fee simple estates.127 This change strengthened the rights of current
owners, who could now transfer the property or incur debts based on
their holdings. In short, the abolition of primogeniture and entail promoted
freedom of testamentary disposition and was consistent with a marketbased concept of property. Rather than inspiring these changes, the
Revolution ratified a reform process already underway in the Colonies.
This sweeping revision of inheritance law reflected new currents of
thought regarding property.128 First, land should be distributed equally
in intestacy. Hence, the elimination of primogeniture encouraged a wide
distribution of a decedent’s property. Second, land was valued for what
profits it could produce, not as a permanent seat of family social position
and political power. Entailed estates made no sense in a society that
treated land as a commodity and in which land speculation and sales on
the open market were frequent.

121. George L. Haskins, The Beginnings of Partible Inheritance in the American
Colonies, 51 YALE L.J. 1280, 1280 (1942).
122. Id. at 1280–81.
123. Historians have debated the extent to which primogeniture and entailing were
used in different colonies. See Katz, supra note 120, at 13 (“Primogeniture did not exist
in many of the colonies, especially in New England, prior to the Revolution, and it is not
clear that the use of either primogeniture or entail to restrict the distribution of property
was widespread.”); C. Ray Keim, Primogeniture and Entail in Colonial Virginia, 25
WM. & MARY Q. 545 (1968).
124. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 30 (pointing out that primogeniture applied only
to intestate estates, and that landowners could make other arrangements by will).
125. Keim, supra note 123, at 585 (concluding that entailed estates prevented land
speculation and constituted a barrier to obtaining a mortgage or credit).
126. FARNAM, supra note 31, at 51–53; Katz, supra note 120, at 11–14; Orth, supra
note 116, at 33.
127. Katz, supra note 120, at 15 (pointing out that the North Carolina legislature
changed holdings in fee tail to fee simple); MORRIS, supra note 113, at 92–93 (noting
that most states made the fee tail a fee simple).
128. Katz, supra note 120, at 11–29.
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Allied to revision of inheritance law was the move to facilitate the
transfer of land. The colonists developed practices to simplify land
transactions. Foremost among these was the system of recording land
titles. New Englanders established public recordation in the seventeenth
century.129 The recordation scheme helped to eliminate confusion and
dispute over land titles and thus encouraged a market for the purchase
and sale of land.130 As one historian has noted, rules requiring “inventory of
estates and recording of land transfers were explicitly designed to
promote the rise of market capitalism by clarifying who owned what and
thereby rendering ownership of property secure.”131 At the same time,
the colonists streamlined deeds and modified the complicated English
legal procedures to determine ownership.
Some Colonies also began to modify the English law that protected
land from the claims of creditors. A desire to attract credit from English
merchants prompted these steps.132 In 1700, for example, the Pennsylvania
legislature enacted a measure which made all the land of a debtor liable
for debts.133 In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries,
several New England Colonies authorized creditors to take land to
satisfy obligations.134
Parliament hastened the process of eliminating the traditional real
property exemption from claims of the creditors in the Colonies with
passage of the Act for the More Easy Recovery of Debts in 1732.135
Reflecting concern by British creditors that colonists were relying on
English law to frustrate collection of debts, the Act declared that all
types of property in the Colonies were liable to satisfy debts.136 They
applied to all debts, not just obligations owed to British creditors.137 As
a practical matter, the Act likely enlarged the market for land both by
judicial sale of debtors’ property and by debtors’ voluntary sales to
satisfy creditors’ claims. Most states adhered to the policy of making
land subject to creditors after the Revolution.138 Claire Priest cogently
concluded: “Another important consequence of the Debt Recovery Act
was to expand the commodification of land. Streamlining the procedures
129. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 27.
130. Id. (“But in a new place, where land was a commodity, recording seemed
necessary—an important tool of the volatile, broadly based land market.”).
131. Nelson, supra note 52, at 359.
132. Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits
in American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385, 411 (2006).
133. Id. at 412.
134. Id. at 408–16.
135. 1732, 5 Geo. 2, c. 7 (Eng.).
136. Priest, supra note 132, at 423–24.
137. Id. at 424.
138. Priest, supra note 132, at 439–47.
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associated with the sale of land by execution made it easier and less
costly for both unsecured and secured creditors to seize land.”139
By the founding era, land was treated as a market commodity.
“Family farms,” Gordon S. Wood declared, “were now thought of less as
patrimonies and more as commodities.”140 Not only was there a large
market for land, but speculation in undeveloped land was common.
Both elite figures and ordinary farmers saw speculation as a path to
wealth.141 “America,” one scholar observed, “witnessed a veritable land
frenzy in the post-Revolutionary period. Eighteenth century Americans
knew that land speculation could be very profitable, and thus nearly
every segment of society, from the lowly squatter to the largest land
baron, engaged in the buying and selling of land.”142 Indeed, private
land companies were organized well before the Revolution to further the
interests of land speculators in acquiring vast tracts of land.143 As is well

139. Id. at 458; see also HUGHES, supra note 91, at 124–25 (discussing impact of
Parliamentary legislation on seizure of land for debt, and declaring “land was in fact
becoming a pure commodity in America”).
140. WOOD, supra note 35, at 128. See also MARSHALL HARRIS, ORIGIN OF THE
LAND TENURE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 310 (1953) (pointing out that during the
colonial era, “land was being looked upon more as a commodity to be sold for a profit
and less as a family estate to be kept for posterity”); Nelson, supra note 52, at 357
(observing that land “had become a valuable commodity” in mid-seventeenth century
Virginia).
141. From the seventeenth century, speculation in land was rife in colonial
America. See FARNAM, supra note 31, at 32–34 (“Speculation in landed property
became active in New England.”); SHAW LIVERMORE, EARLY AMERICAN LAND
COMPANIES: THEIR INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT 27–28 (1939) (discussing
land speculation in eighteenth century New England); Charles S. Grant, Land
Speculation and the Settlement of Kent, 1738–1760, 28 NEW ENG. Q. 51, 54 (1955)
(“Kent emphatically bears out the standard contention on the prevalence of
speculation.”); John L. Harr, Land Speculation as a Theme in Southern History, 11
NORTHWEST MO. ST. U. STUD. 1, 4–12 (1981) (discussing land speculation in southern
Colonies before the Revolution).
142. Jonathan J. Bean, Marketing “the Great American Commodity”: Nathaniel
Massie and Land Speculation on the Ohio Frontier, 1783–1813, 103 OHIO HIST. 152,
156 (1998). See also THOMAS PERKINS ABERNETHY, FROM FRONTIER TO PLANTATION IN
TENNESSEE: A STUDY IN FRONTIER DEMOCRACY 19 (1932) (“Speculation in lands was the
most absorbing American enterprise during the later Colonial, the Revolutionary, and the
early Republican periods. . . . [I]n those days, the country was run largely by speculators
in real estate.”).
143. For the role of private land companies, see HARRIS, supra note 140, at 289–
309; ERIC HINDERAKER, ELUSIVE EMPIRES: CONSTRUCTING COLONIALISM IN THE OHIO
VALLEY, 1673–1800, at 166–69 (1997) (discussing impact of the Illinois Company and
speculative activity on trans-Appalachian development schemes before the Revolution);
LIVERMORE, supra note 141, at 74–132.
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known, many leaders of the Revolutionary cause were active land
speculators.144 George Washington, for example, was involved in a
number of speculative land ventures.145
For Americans of the eighteenth century, land speculation was much
like participation in the stock market to later generations. In practice,
this trading spirit superseded traditional English rules governing land
ownership and transfer. The robust buying and selling of land without
government intervention spoke volumes about the growing sentiment in
favor of economic liberty. It is more revealing of economic attitudes
than waning efforts to enforce obsolete price controls and market
regulations.
VII. THE RISE OF CONTRACT
As price controls and regulated markets declined and land speculation
quickened, contracts assumed a greater role in the emerging commercial
society of the late eighteenth century. In an expanding economy,
merchants were more likely to trade or extend credit to persons who
were strangers. Under such circumstances, transactions could not safely
be grounded in trust or custom. Hence, private bargains in an impersonal
market were increasingly governed by written agreements.146 Parties
became accustomed to making deals and looking out for their own
interests.147 The origins of modern contract law, which developed rapidly
in the nineteenth century, can be traced to this period.
Contracts constituted a legal expression of growing free market
values. They provided a vehicle by which individualists could bargain
for their own advantage. Contractual exchange not only promoted
economic efficiency, but also underscored the autonomy of individuals.
144. For example, both James Wilson and Robert Morris were engaged in largescale land speculation. See CHARLES PAGE SMITH, JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER,
1742–1798, at 159–68 (1956) (“Almost without exception the Revolutionary leaders
dabbled in land.”); ELLIS PAXSON OBERHOLTZER, ROBERT MORRIS: PATRIOT AND
FINANCIER 301–13 (1903).
145. See generally CHARLES ROYSTER, THE FABULOUS HISTORY OF THE DISMAL
SWAMP COMPANY: A STORY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON’S TIMES (1999) (discussing
Washington’s participation in the Dismal Swamp Company, a failed speculative
venture); A.M. SAKOLSKI, THE GREAT AMERICAN LAND BUBBLE 4–12 (1932) (discussing
Washington’s interest in western land).
146. BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN
EARLY CONNECTICUT 34–41 (1987) (pointing out that credit transactions in early
eighteenth century Connecticut were increasingly governed by written instruments);
DEBORAH A. ROSEN, COURTS AND COMMERCE: GENDER, LAW, AND THE MARKET
ECONOMY IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 59–62, 83 (1997) (discussing increased use of
contracts to govern economic relationships in eighteenth century New York); WOOD,
supra note 35, at 162–63.
147. WOOD, supra note 35, at 162–64.
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Economic rights were the product of private bargaining, not governmental
authority. To achieve these goals, the stability of contracts was essential. It
was necessary that bargains be honored and not subject to subsequent
interference.
Careful studies of several Colonies bear out the growing importance of
contract law and a free market economy. William E. Nelson discovered
that “a vibrant market economy” based on tobacco sales developed in
Virginia as early as the mid-seventeenth century.148 This robust economy
“gave rise to complex commercial transactions and commercial
litigation.”149 Nelson concluded that in Virginia by the 1640s, “the
hallmark doctrine of market capitalism, that individuals should be free to
enter into contracts which courts would then enforce, was firmly in
place.”150
Similarly, Nelson found that the judiciary in colonial Pennsylvania
wanted to encourage economic development. As he explained, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court “wanted to establish rules of law that
would help entrepreneurs bring business to Pennsylvania and thereby
develop its economy and bring wealth to its inhabitants.”151 To achieve
these goals, the colonial judges fixed clear legal rules to govern the
collection of debts. In fact, courts in colonial Pennsylvania spent more
time on debt collection than on any other matter.152
VIII. IMPACT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
The American Revolution produced contrary trends with respect to
economic liberty. The outbreak of war with Great Britain disrupted
long-settled trading patterns and sparked steep inflation.153 Colonial
currency rapidly lost value.154 In this turbulent situation, a renewed
regulatory impulse clashed with calls for economic freedom.
Demonstrating that old patterns of behavior die hard, state lawmakers
responded to wartime economic upheaval with a program of wage and

148. Nelson, supra note 52, at 357.
149. Id. at 358.
150. Id. at 360.
151. William E. Nelson, Government by Judiciary: The Growth of Judicial Power
in Colonial Pennsylvania, 59 SMU L. REV. 3, 35 (2006).
152. Id. at 35–37.
153. JEROME J. NADELHAFT, THE DISORDERS OF WAR: THE REVOLUTION IN SOUTH
CAROLINA 155–72 (1981).
154. Id.
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price controls reminiscent of the seventeenth century.155 As might be
expected, such efforts were largely fruitless. Outspoken critics attacked
wage and price controls as both unworkable and as an impairment of
economic rights.
To understand these cross-currents, consider the experience of Connecticut
in the Revolutionary era. During 1776, legislators passed a number of
laws regulating prices and wages.156 Late that year, a convention of
New England states recommended that each state in the region set a
common price and wage schedule.157 In line with this recommendation,
Connecticut lawmakers enacted a comprehensive measure that merits
careful analysis. The law demonstrated a remarkably unsophisticated
grasp of the reasons behind the price surge. It proclaimed that “the rapid
and exorbitant rise upon the necessities and conveniences of life in this
day of public calamity and distress is chiefly occasioned by monopolizers,
the great pest of society, who prefer their own private gain to the interest
and safety of their country . . . .”158 For good measure, the act further
stated that “goods in general imported have of late owing to the
unbounded avarice of some persons been sold by wholesale at the
exorbitant advance of five and six hundred per cent.”159 Having
attributed wartime inflation to the greed of individuals rather than
fundamental causes, the statute set the maximum daily wage for farm
laborers.160 It also fixed prices for produce ranging from wheat and beef
to rum and potatoes.161 There were even special schedules for goods
imported from Europe.162 Violators of the wage and price regulations
were subject to fines.163 As early as May of 1777, however, lawmakers
found it necessary to adjust the regulated price for many items, and to
abandon controls on salt and beef.164

155. See generally MORRIS, supra note 5, at 92–135, and Bull, supra note 67, at
319–27, for wage and price regulations of the Revolutionary era.
156. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 93–94.
157. Id. at 94–95.
158. An Act to Prevent Monopolies and Oppression by Excessive and Unreasonable
Prices of Many of the Necessaries and Conveniences of Life (1776), in 1776 ACTS AND
LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT IN AMERICA 437 (New London, Timothy Green
1776).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. An Act in Addition to, and Alteration of an Act of this State, Entitled, An Act
to Prevent Monopolies and Oppression by Excessive and Unreasonable Prices for Many
of the Necessaries and Conveniences of Life (1777), in 1777 ACTS AND LAWS OF THE
STATE OF CONNECTICUT IN AMERICA 457, 462 (New London, Timothy Green 1777).
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Congress debated the New England price regulation scheme in the
winter of 1777 and ultimately declined to endorse this program. Many
in Congress doubted the practicality of price and wage regulations.165
John Adams argued that such a scheme “was tried in vain even in the
absolute government of France. The high price of many Articles arises
from their scarcity.”166 In New England, the controls aroused dissatisfaction
and were deeply unpopular with farmers.167 By the summer of 1777, the
New England states, including Connecticut, repealed the wage and price
regulations.168
Advocates of regulation, however, did not give up easily. In 1778,
Connecticut, joined by New York and Pennsylvania, established yet
another regime of wage and price controls.169 These, too, proved shortlived. Congress, in June of 1778, recommended repeal of such regulations,
reasoning, “[I]t hath been found by Experience that Limitations upon the
Prices of Commodities are not only ineffectual for the Purposes proposed,
but likewise productive of very evil Consequences to the Great Detriment of
the public Service and greivous [sic] Oppression of Individuals.”170
Given this negative congressional attitude, Connecticut and other states
promptly repealed their latest wage and price controls.171 To be sure,
there were persistent efforts throughout the Revolutionary period to fix
prices at the local level.172 Few modern observers are surprised that
these Revolutionary attempts to legislate wages and prices were
fruitless.173 American history is littered with failed efforts to set prices.

165.
166.
167.
168.

MORRIS, supra note 5, at 97–100.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 101.
An Act for Repealing an Act, etc. (1777), in 1777 ACTS AND LAWS OF THE
STATE OF CONNECTICUT IN AMERICA 473, 474 (New London, Timothy Green 1777).
169. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 106. For the Pennsylvania Statute of 1778, see Bull,
supra note 67, at 322–23 (pointing out that the Act was suspended and eventually
repealed without having ever gone into effect). It is noteworthy that Massachusetts did
not join in this effort, and did not enact any additional statewide law fixing wages and
prices for the remainder of the Revolutionary era. Id. at 322.
170. 11 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 569 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1908), available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwjc.html.
171. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 107.
172. Id. at 109–17. See also Andrew McFarland Davis, The Limitation of Prices in
Massachusetts 1776–1779, in 10 PUBLICATIONS OF THE COLONIAL SOCIETY OF
MASSACHUSETTS 119 (1907).
173. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 43 (observing that wage and price regulations
were “briefly and ineffectively revived during the Revolutionary War, as an emergency
measure”).
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What is significant, however, is that arguments against such regulations
were often couched in terms of economic liberty. A 1777 writer asserted
that price fixing “always has and ever will be impracticable in a free
country, because no law can be framed to limit a man in the purchase or
disposal of property, but what must infringe those principles of liberty
for which we are gloriously fighting.”174 In 1778, John Witherspoon
insisted that “[f]ixing Prices by Law never had nor ever will have any
Effect but stopping Commerce and making Things scarce and dear.”175
A year later a number of Philadelphians petitioned the city to end price
controls, insisting that such regulations infringed the rights of property
owners by preventing the sale of goods in an open market.176
In the same vein, Gouverneur Morris, later a member of the
Constitutional Convention, assailed Pennsylvania’s Revolutionary era
price controls. He argued that such regulations were not only foolish as
a matter of economic policy but also amounted to an invasion of
property rights.177 The regulation of prices, he asserted, “gave a woeful
impression of the new governments, by laying down a violation of the
rights of property as the corner stone on which they were to be erected.”178
The Pennsylvania Constitution contained a unique provision requiring
that a Council of Censors be elected every seven years. The duty of this
body was to report whether the Constitution had been preserved.
Invoking the Pennsylvania Bill of Rights that guaranteed “a right to be
protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property,” the Council
found in 1784 that market and price regulations were unconstitutional.
Specifically, the Council declared:
Some of the acts of assembly, made to prevent forestalling, were also
unconstitutional invasions of the rights of property.
....
It is the opinion of this committee, that the attempts which have been made to
regulate the prices of commodities, were absurd and impossible. They tended to
produce the very opposite effects to those which they were designed to produce,
and were invasions of the right of property.179

174. Letter to the Editor, CONN. COURANT, May 12, 1777, at 1.
175. Letter from John Witherspoon to William Churchill Houston (Jan. 27, 1778),
in 3 LETTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 57 (Edmund C. Burnett ed., 1926).
176. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 117.
177. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 72–74 (1990). For
the role of Gouverneur Morris in drafting the Constitution, see generally RICHARD
BROOKHISER, GENTLEMAN REVOLUTIONARY: GOUVERNEUR MORRIS—THE RAKE WHO
WROTE THE CONSTITUTION (2003).
178. Letter from an American, To the Inhabitants of America, PA. PACKET, Mar. 23,
1780, at 2.
179. THE PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO CALLING THE CONVENTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790,
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By 1783, then, the property clause of the Pennsylvania Bill of Rights
was construed to affirm the right of owners to sell their goods at market
prices.
I make no claim that Americans of the Revolutionary era were of one
mind in rejecting wage and price regulations. Clearly the public was
divided and advocates of regulations were persistent. By the same
token, opponents of regulation gained the upper hand by weaving
together practical objections and constitutional arguments grounded in
economic liberty. Moreover, the debate over wartime controls had a
lasting consequence. One result, according to Richard B. Morris, was
“the crystallization of sentiment” among members of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 “in favor of laissez faire policies in the internal
economic life of the nation.”180 Moreover, opposition to wage and price
controls was increasingly framed in terms of constitutionally protected
rights. In the aftermath of the American Revolution, the distinguished
treatise writer Thomas M. Cooley observed in 1878, “it has been commonly
supposed that a general power in the State to regulate prices was
inconsistent with constitutional liberty.”181
The dispute over wage and price controls in the Revolutionary period
lends support to the thesis that Americans of the late eighteenth century
were increasingly receptive to ideas of economic liberty, but even more
compelling evidence can be found in early state constitutions. The
influential Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, for instance, declared that all
men “have certain inherent rights . . . ; namely, the enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”182 Likewise, the New
Hampshire Constitution of 1784 stated: “All men have certain natural,
essential, and inherent rights; among which are—the enjoying and defending
life and liberty—acquiring, possessing and protecting property—and in a

at 87, 113 (Harrisburg, Pa., John S. Wiestling 1825).
180. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 118.
181. THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 742 (4th
ed. 1878).
182. VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 1, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 3813 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS].
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word, of seeking and obtaining happiness.”183 Similar language asserting
the right to acquire property appeared in several other early state constitutions,
including constitutions in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania.184 Such
provisions did more than just secure existing property arrangements;
they guaranteed the right to obtain property. Right-to-acquire language
held out the promise of economic opportunity for all persons.185
As further evidence of this commitment to economic liberty, states
took steps to discourage undue concentration of wealth. The abolition of
primogeniture and entail has already been considered. Several state
constitutions also prohibited grants of monopoly. The North Carolina
Constitution of 1776, for example, proclaimed that monopolies “are
contrary to the genius of a free State and ought not to be allowed.”186
Along the same line, four state conventions that ratified the proposed
Federal Constitution urged an amendment barring monopolies. This
aversion to grants of special economic privilege underscored the broad
based support for economic liberty.187
IX. THE CONTRACT CLAUSE
It remains to link the growing free market ideology to the framing of
the United States Constitution. The delegates to the Philadelphia
Convention were to a large degree prompted by the desire to bring about
a greater protection of economic rights.188 Yet for the most part,
notwithstanding their dedication to the rights of property owners, the
Framers initially relied on institutional and political arrangements to
safeguard individual rights.189 The basic constitutional scheme was to
183. N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. II, reprinted in 4 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 182, at 2453–54.
184. James W. Ely, Jr., “To Pursue Any Lawful Trade or Avocation”: The
Evolution of Unenumerated Economic Rights in the Nineteenth Century, 8 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 917, 918–19 (2006).
185. Id. See also FARNAM, supra note 31, at 124–25:
The general presumption of the bills of rights in the early constitutions and in
the first eight amendments to the Federal Constitution was in favor of the
liberty of the individual, and the protection of his property rights against
arbitrary power on the part of the government. This in turn created a
presumption in favor of personal freedom against the subordination of human
rights to property rights. It also created a presumption in favor of equality of
opportunity.
Id.
186. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § XXIII, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 182, at 2788.
187. Ely, supra note 184, at 931.
188. GOTTFRIED DIETZE, AMERICA’S POLITICAL DILEMMA: FROM LIMITED TO
UNLIMITED DEMOCRACY 66 (1968).
189. Wayne McCormack, Lochner, Liberty, Property, and Human Rights, 1 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 432, 451 (2005) (“The original draftsmen focused on the structure of
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protect personal and economic liberty through elaborate procedural
devices—notably, the separation of powers among the branches of the
federal government.190 Still, many provisions of the original Constitution
pertain to economic interests.191 A number of these restricted the power
of the states, whose excesses had done much to trigger the call for a new
national government.192 The most important of these provisions for our
purpose was the Contract Clause.193 This Clause best exemplifies the
Framers’ commitment to economic liberty and warrants a brief exploration.
To trace the origins of the Contract Clause, we must start by
considering the troubled economic circumstances of post-Revolutionary
America. Attaining independence caused much economic dislocation.194
It ended the trade restrictions imposed by the English Navigation Acts,
but also brought about the loss of markets with Great Britain and its
other colonies. The Revolution, moreover, generated wholesale interference
with economic arrangements by state legislatures. Responding to depressed
economic conditions following independence, state lawmakers enacted a
host of debt-relief laws designed to help debtors at the expense of
creditors.195 Such measures included stays on the collection of debts, laws
allowing the payment of debts in installments, and statutes authorizing
the payment of obligations in commodities.196 State lawmakers also
issued quantities of paper money, and made such paper currency legal
tender for the payment of debts.197 These laws not only discouraged
commerce by frustrating the enforcement of contracts but portended
threats to the security of property generally. As Chief Justice John
Marshall recalled,
The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and creditor, of
interfering with contracts, a power which comes home to every man, touches
the interest of all, and controls the conduct of every individual in those things

government out of a belief that diffusion of power among different organs would obviate
the need for specific guarantees of individual rights.”).
190. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at
150–61, 547–62 (1998).
191. ELY, supra note 1, at 43–46.
192. Id. at 45.
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 provides in part: “No State shall . . . pass any . . .
Law impairing the obligation of Contracts . . . .”
194. Bruchey, supra note 2, at 1138–39.
195. NADELHAFT, supra note 153.
196. Id.
197. Id.; ALLAN NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION,
1775–1789, at 404–05, 537, 571 (1924).
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which he supposes to be proper for his own exclusive management, had been
used to such an excess by the state legislatures, as to break in upon the ordinary
intercourse of society, and destroy all confidence between man and man. This
mischief had become so great, so alarming, as not only to impair commercial
intercourse, and threaten the existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the
people, and destroy the sanctity of private faith. To guard against the
continuance of the evil, was an object of deep interest with all the truly wise, as
well as the virtuous, of this great community, and was one of the important
benefits expected from a reform of the government.198

In short, the bitter post-Revolutionary experience convinced many
political leaders that state protection of contractual rights was inadequate.199
The forerunner of the Contract Clause can be found in the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787.200 The Confederation Congress enacted the Ordinance
in July of that year to provide territorial governance for the area of the
Old Northwest. Articulating a number of fundamental principles, the
Ordinance had much of the character of a constitutional document.201
The Ordinance contained several important provisions regarding the
rights of property owners, including one ensuring the sanctity of private
contracts. Article 2 of the Ordinance stated:
And, in the just preservation of rights and property, it is understood and
declared, that no law ought ever to be made or have force in the said territory,
that shall, in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts, or
engagements, bona fide, and without fraud previously formed.202

This language was evidently inserted as part of a larger scheme to
encourage economic development in the largely unsettled territories.
Viewed in this light, the protection of agreements was a crucial step in
attracting eastern investors.203 The territorial government was prevented
from abridging private economic deals, creating a hospitable climate for
outside capital.

198. Ogden v. Saunders, 27 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 354–55 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.,
dissenting).
199. Priest, supra note 132, at 397 (“Fear of the consequences of such
democratically enacted policies was one of the reasons for including the Contracts
Clause in the United States Constitution, as a means for the federal courts to regulate
state legislatures’ debt relief measures.”).
200. James W. Ely, Jr., The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A Reappraisal, 33
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023, 1030–31 (2000).
201. See Denis P. Duffey, Note, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional
Document, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1995).
202. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 2, reprinted in 32 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 340 (R. Hill ed., 1936), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwjc.html.
203. Andrew R.L. Cayton, The Northwest Ordinance from the Perspective of the
Frontier, in THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE 1787: A BICENTENNIAL HANDBOOK 1, 8–10
(Robert M. Taylor, Jr. ed., 1987); Duffey, supra note 201, at 938, 960.
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Congress enacted the Northwest Ordinance while the Constitutional
Convention was meeting in Philadelphia.204 In August of 1787, the
delegates were considering constitutional limitations on the power of the
states. Rufus King of Massachusetts moved to insert into the Constitution
“in the words used in the Ordinance of [Congress] establishing new
States, a prohibition on the States to interfere in private contracts.”205
Both the process by which the Contract Clause was adopted as part of
the Constitution and the intended scope of the Clause have been the
subject of extensive historical inquiry.206 It is not my purpose to enter
that debate here. There was surprisingly little discussion of the Contract
Clause by the delegates at the Convention given its subsequent
significance in American constitutionalism.207 The evidence shows that
the immediate impetus for the Clause was to curb state debtor relief
measures that undercut the sanctity of contracts and threatened credit
relationships.208 At the very least, the Framers clearly wished to assure the

204. Duffey, supra note 201, at 929–30.
205. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 439 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1937).
206. The classic, if dated, history of the Contract Clause is BENJAMIN FLETCHER
WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1938). For helpful recent
studies, see Steven R. Boyd, The Contract Clause and the Evolution of American
Federalism, 1789–1815, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 529 (1987) and James W. Ely, Jr., Origins
and Development of the Contract Clause (Apr. 8, 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=839904). Scholars have long debated whether the
Contract Clause was expected to apply only to private agreements or to public contracts
by state governments as well. Compare Ely, supra note 200, at 1029–33 (contending
that the Marshall Court’s application of the Contract Clause to public as well as private
agreements was consistent with both the purpose and language of the clause), and
Douglas W. Kmiec & John O. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original
Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 539 n.67 (1987) (“A distinction between
public and private contracts is unwarranted in view of the lack of language limiting the
application of the Clause to private contracts or similarly limiting discussion at the
Convention.”), with WRIGHT, supra, at 31–32 (illustrating how the Marshall Court
expanded application of the Contract Clause beyond objectives of the Framers), and
Thomas W. Merrill, Public Contracts, Private Contracts, and the Transformation of the
Constitutional Order, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 600 (1987) (arguing that a strong
case can be made that the Contract Clause “was not thought to impose a general duty on
state governments to honor their own obligations”).
207. WRIGHT, supra note 206, at 9–10.
208. Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. 703, 72 (1984) (pointing out that the debtor-creditor relationship “was one
leading concern of the [F]ramers in drafting the clause”).
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stability of contractual arrangements by preventing state abridgements of
contracts.209
It is revealing that the Framers saw contractual rights as sufficiently
important to warrant a specific ban on state impairment. By the time of
the Philadelphia Convention, contracts were widely seen as a vital aspect
of economic liberty.210 Interference with contracts amounted to an attack on
private economic ordering. In addition, contracts also represented an
increasingly significant type of commercial wealth.211
Just as the Framers of the Federal Constitution drew upon the
Northwest Ordinance, so the Federal Constitution and Bill of Rights
became an influential model for later state constitutions. In particular,
many states adopted provisions designed to safeguard the security of
contracts. When Pennsylvania and South Carolina revised their fundamental
laws in 1790, they added a contract clause. Thus, the Pennsylvania
Constitution stated “[t]hat no ex post facto law, nor any law impairing
contracts, shall be made.”212 A large number of the constitutions of the
newer states followed suit. The Kentucky Constitution (1792), the Tennessee
Constitution (1796), the Louisiana Constitution (1812), the Mississippi
Constitution (1817), the Illinois Constitution (1818), the Alabama
Constitution (1819), the Missouri Constitution (1820), the Michigan
Constitution (1835), and the Florida Constitution (1838) all contained a
clause barring the impairment of contracts. In addition, the Virginia
Constitution, as revised in 1830, included a contract clause. Although
not all states in the antebellum era adopted a contract clause, enough did
to reinforce the high standing of contractual rights in the constitutional
order.

209. Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 206, at 534 (“[T]he history of the Clause
suggests that it was aimed at all retrospective, redistributive schemes in violation of
vested contractual rights, of which debtor relief was merely a prime example.”).
210. Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J.
453, 537 (1989).
This was the Federalist effort to link the eighteenth century’s affirmation of
individual liberty with the rhetoric of contract and private property. Thus, the
Federalists valued market “freedom” so highly that they forbade the states from
“impairing the obligation of Contract” in the original 1787 Constitution, at a
time when they believed an elaborate Bill of Rights unnecessary.
Id.
211. See HUGHES, supra note 91, at 122–23 (stressing the importance of contracts in
colonial business transactions); Nelson, supra note 52, at 357–58 (discussing litigation
over contracts dealing with land, commodities, and servants).
212. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 17, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 182, at 3101.
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X. EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT
Evidence of the Framers’ thinking with respect to economic liberty
can be derived from the policies that colonial and state governments
pursued in the late eighteenth century. Developments in the legal culture
were moving unmistakably, albeit unevenly, toward a freer economy.
The decline of mercantilism, the withering of wage and price controls,
the pervasive land speculation, the overthrow of the English navigational
system, and the rise of contracting all pointed toward a new economic
and legal order. No doubt the Framers were familiar with these trends
and most likely approved of them. These economic liberty tendencies
informed the constitution-making process and dovetailed with deep
tenets of Anglo-American constitutional thought.
Leading political figures of the founding generation drew upon
currents of constitutional theory and economic philosophy in England.
English political theorist John Locke had an enormous impact on the
American concept of constitutionalism.213 A proponent of natural law
and representative government, Locke famously insisted that the very
purpose of government was the preservation of “lives, liberties, and
estates.”214 It is difficult to overestimate Locke’s influence. “By the late
eighteenth century,” Pauline Maier has cogently noted, “‘Lockean’ ideas
on government and revolution were accepted everywhere in America;
they seemed, in fact, a statement of principles built into English
constitutional tradition.”215 It followed that the Framers generally adhered
to the Lockean notion that individual property ownership was a natural
right with which government had only limited power to interfere.
The ideas of the Scottish political economist Adam Smith, whose
landmark treatise, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations, was published in 1776, also had a strong appeal to
Americans.216 A champion of entrepreneurial freedom and the market
213. Ellen Frankel Paul, Freedom of Contract and the “Political Economy” of
Lochner v. New York, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 515, 528–37 (2005) (discussing
influence of Locke on drafting the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions of the
Revolutionary era).
214. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 178 (Mark Goldie ed., J.M.
Dent 2000) (1690).
215. PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE 87 (1997).
216. JAMES L. HUSTON, SECURING THE FRUITS OF LABOR: THE AMERICAN CONCEPT
OF WEALTH DISTRIBUTION, 1775–1900, at 69–75 (1998) (discussing the affinity between
Smith and American Revolutionary leaders).
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economy, Smith urged minimal governmental oversight of economic
activity. He stressed the self-adjusting nature of a free-market economy.217
“Smith and his successors,” one scholar has observed, “explained how
the ‘invisible hand’ of self-interest in the marketplace produced general
well-being in the economy and augmented national wealth.”218 Smith’s
assault on mercantilism did much to hasten its decay.219 Although neither
the Framers nor the general public embraced a strict laissez-faire policy
sometimes associated with Smith, the new nation had largely a free
market economy grounded on economic liberty.
Important members of the founding generation underscored this
commitment to economic freedom. James Madison, for instance, commented
at length on the relationship between property ownership, the economy,
and the Constitution. In the famous tenth essay in The Federalist, he
maintained that extending the sphere of the proposed new national
government would prevent any interest group from gaining control and
invading the rights of others. “[A] rage for paper money, for an abolition of
debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or
wicked project,” Madison declared, “will be less apt to pervade the whole
body of the Union, than a particular member of it . . . .”220 For purposes of
this article, Madison’s theory of broad representation as a way to diffuse
interest group pressure is less important than his strong disapproval of
contractual interference and property redistribution by government, both
described as “improper and wicked.” Madison regarded redistributive
schemes as not only foolish policy but also as violative of liberty. He
was especially concerned about interferences with contractual transactions
because they were less apparent than outright confiscation and were
therefore more dangerous. To make his views more explicit, Madison
stated that “laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the
first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound

217. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 193 (2d ed.
2006).
218. HUSTON, supra note 216, at 69–70.
219. Lars G. Magnusson, Mercantilism, in A COMPANION TO THE HISTORY OF
ECONOMIC THOUGHT 47 (Warren J. Samuels et al. eds., 2003) (analyzing Smith’s critique
of the mercantile system); William D. Grampp, The Liberal Elements in English
Mercantilism, 66 Q.J. ECON. 465, 465 (1952):
It is also customary to describe mercantilism as the antithesis of liberal, or classical,
economic doctrine. Adam Smith used some of his strongest invective against
it, and since his time mercantilism has been thoroughly condemned by liberal
economists because its practices were the very kind of interference which they
always have regarded as useless, unwise, or mischievous.
220. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 49 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
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legislation.”221 He pictured the Contract Clause as a “bulwark in favor
of personal security and private rights.”222
As a member of the first Congress, Madison took the lead in
formulating the Bill of Rights.223 He included protection for the rights of
property owners in his proposals, and two important guarantees were
incorporated in the Fifth Amendment, along with procedural safeguards
for criminal trials.224 The Fifth Amendment explicitly reflected the Lockean
view that protection of property was a chief aim of government.
Madison thought of property as imposing a limit on the power of
government, thereby allowing a large area for private economic ordering.
Madison’s commitment to economic liberty was underscored in his
famous 1792 essay, Property.225 Here, Madison broadly defined property
to encompass freedom of expression and religious liberty as well as
possessions.226 Reflecting his aversion to special economic privileges,
he stressed the right of individuals to follow vocations of their choice:
That is not a just government, nor is property secure under it, where arbitrary
restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to part of its citizens that free use
of their faculties, and free choice of their occupations, which not only constitute
their property in the general sense of the word; but are the means of acquiring
property strictly so called. What must be the spirit of legislation where a
manufacturer of linen cloth is forbidden to bury his own child in a linen shroud,
in order to favour his neighbour who manufactures woolen cloth; where the
manufacturer and wearer of woolen cloth are again forbidden the oeconomical
[sic] use of buttons of that material, in favor of the manufacturer of buttons of
other materials!227

As this suggests, Madison saw one’s ability to acquire property as an
inherent aspect of personal liberty.228 To restrict the right to acquire
property was in effect to limit individual liberty. According to Jennifer
Nedelsky, Madison believed that government should “ensure the free

221. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison), id., at 227.
222. Id.
223. ELY, supra note 1, at 53–54.
224. The Fifth Amendment provides in part that no person shall be “deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
225. James Madison, Property, NATIONAL GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in 1
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 598, 598–99 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987).
226. Id. at 598.
227. Id. at 598–99.
228. See NEDELSKY, supra note 177, at 29–30 (stressing Madison’s endorsement of
the right to acquire property).
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exercise of the faculties of acquisition by preventing unwarranted or
discriminatory restrictions on this freedom.”229 Government, in other
words, was not just to protect the existing rights of owners but to
preserve opportunity.
This is not to say that Madison ruled out all governmental regulations
of property. He left room for the states to promote and control economic
behavior, but he opposed both monopoly privilege and redistributive
schemes that helped some at the expense of others.230
There is no way to determine the extent to which Madison’s views
were representative of the Framers as a whole. But considering his key
role in drafting the Constitution and Bill of Rights, it is appropriate to
give special weight to his understanding of economic rights. Madison,
moreover, left a lasting imprint on American constitutionalism. As
Nedelsky observed,
[T]he notion that property and contract were essential ingredients of the liberty
the Constitution was to protect, was common to Madison, Marshall, and the
twentieth-century advocates of laissez-faire. And the idea that property and
contract could define the legitimate scope of governmental power was a basic
component of constitutionalism from 1787 to 1937.231

Certainly, Alexander Hamilton shared Madison’s distaste for legislative
abridgement of contractual rights. Seen by some historians as the author
of the Contract Clause, Hamilton pictured laws abridging contractual
obligations as “atrocious breaches of moral obligation and social justice.”232
He stressed the utilitarian role of contracts in commercial life. In The
Federalist, for example, Hamilton stated: “Laws in violation of private
contracts . . . amount to aggressions on the rights of those States, whose
citizens are injured by them . . . .”233 In his mind, state laws impairing
contracts would negatively impact the flow of commerce among the
states. Speaking of the various restrictions on state power in Article 10,
Section 10 of the Constitution, Hamilton hailed “the precautions against
the repetition of those practices on the part of the state governments,
which have undermined the foundations of property and credit . . . .”234
Following ratification of the Constitution, Hamilton urged a broad

229.
230.
231.
232.
1961).
233.
234.
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SIEGAN, supra note 217, at 59–60; ELY, supra note 1, at 49–50, 56.
NEDELSKY, supra note 177, at 228.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 43 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
Id. at 42.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton), id., at 588.
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reading of the Contract Clause to encompass state legislation impairing a
state’s own obligations.235
Hamilton was not an adherent of a laissez-faire philosophy. As Secretary
of the Treasury, he proposed an ambitious program of protective tariffs
and subsidies to encourage economic growth.236 He also successfully
recommended that Congress charter a national bank—a hybrid institution
largely under private control—to stabilize the currency.237 Yet Hamilton
was familiar with the work of Adam Smith and was a forceful supporter
of a market economy based on private property and security of contracts.238
Although he saw room for government to promote business, he declared
in 1801, “In matters of industry, human enterprise ought, doubtless, to
be left free in the main, not fettered by too much regulation.”239
Other evidence of the likely intention of the Framers is provided by
James Wilson. He had been heavily involved in the controversy over the
repeal of the charter of the Bank of North America.240 In 1785, at the
behest of radicals and agrarians, the Pennsylvania legislature revoked the
charter of the bank.241 Wilson argued at length against this step, likening
the charter to a contract.242 He maintained that state legislatures could
not abridge contracts. As Nedelsky noted: “Not only did [Wilson] think
that upholding contracts was extremely important economically, he saw
the obligation of contract as part of the fundamental obligation to fulfill
promises which makes society possible.”243

235. 4 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 430–31 (Julius Goebel, Jr. &
Joseph H. Smith eds., 1980). See generally C. PETER MAGRATH, YAZOO: LAW AND
POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 21–30 (1966) (analyzing Hamilton’s argument that the
Contract Clause prevented a state from breaking its contractual arrangement).
236. PETER MCNAMARA, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND STATESMANSHIP: SMITH,
HAMILTON, AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC 128–39 (1998).
237. Id. at 124–28.
238. Characterizing Hamilton as the “chief agent of a market economy,” a recent
biographer has declared: “Hamilton did not create America’s market economy so much
as foster the cultural and legal setting in which it flourished.” RON CHERNOW,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 345 (2004).
239. Alexander Hamilton, The Examination No. 3 (Dec. 24, 1801), in 25 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 467 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1977).
240. SMITH, supra note 144, at 146, 150–53.
241. Id. at 148–55.
242. Id. at 152–53; Ely, supra note 206, at 15–18.
243. NEDELSKY, supra note 177, at 299 n.141.
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XI. CONCLUSION
The economic values embraced by the Constitution and Bill of Rights
are hotly contested.244 Is the principle of economic liberty built into the
Constitution and Bill of Rights—and to what extent—or is the Constitution
simply neutral regarding economic issues? It bears emphasis that there
was a consensus among the Framers that property and contractual rights
should be protected.245 These were seen as essential to achieve both
political liberty and the advantages of a market economy. The Framers
crafted the provisions in the Constitution and Bill of Rights to guarantee
economic rights.
The historical record stops short of establishing that the Framers
expected the Constitution to embody a particular theory, such as laissezfaire, but it does not follow that the Constitution was entirely neutral
with respect to economic rights. Property and contractual rights were
assigned a high value by the Framers, and were protected by language in
the Constitution and Bill of Rights. Legislators were free to fashion
economic policy so long as they respected these bedrock rights.
Lawmakers, therefore, did not have carte blanche to devise policies that
infringed property and contractual rights. Although there is room to
debate—as people did at the time of the founding—which legislative
acts and regulations violate such rights, one can fairly conclude that the
Framers envisioned a substantially free market economy with a large
measure of economic liberty for individuals to pursue their own interest.
“Federalists proposed, in sum,” Kermit L. Hall and Peter Karsten cogently
observe, “to place the new land in the mainstream of acquisitive
capitalism.”246 Moreover, as Joyce Appleby reminds us, the ascendancy
of a market culture following the Revolution “took place in the United
States under circumstances that forged a powerful link between political
and economic freedom.”247

244. Compare Siegan, supra note 3 (maintaining that the Framers anticipated a
protective constitutional framework for property), with William Letwin, The Economic
Policy of the Constitution, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 121–39 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1989)
(insisting that the Framers assumed private ownership of property but did not embody
any particular economic policy in the Constitution).
245. Bruchey, supra note 2, at 1136.
246. HALL & KARSTEN, supra note 22, at 72.
247. JOYCE APPLEBY, INHERITING THE REVOLUTION: THE FIRST GENERATION OF
AMERICANS 56 (2000).
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